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national security concerns.1 In an effort to safeguard the United
States and Americans everywhere from similar acts of destruction in
the future, Congress passed the Uniting and Strengthening America
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act of 2001 (“USA PATRIOT Act” or “Patriot Act”).2
Congress passed the 400-page Act almost exactly six weeks after the
events of September 11, 2001.3 The Patriot Act provides a lengthy
and elaborate compilation of amendments to pre-existing federal law
in areas such as surveillance, international money laundering, border
protection, and foreign intelligence.4
The staggeringly swift passage of this vast piece of legislation meant
that members of Congress had little opportunity to review the Act’s
myriad provisions before voting on it.5 One set of provisions
expanded the pen register6 surveillance law, which traditionally had
guided federal agents when monitoring the numbers dialed from a
In the eyes of civil libertarians and
suspect’s telephone.7
1. See Bart Kosko, Editorial, Your Privacy Is a Disappearing Act: A Digital Spying
Net May or May Not Catch Terrorists, but It Will Ensnare Us, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2,
2001, at M5 (arguing that after the attacks, people living in the United States
sacrificed various civil liberties for a “potential increase in protection from
terrorists”).
2. See Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 272 (2001) (stating that the Act serves
to “deter and punish” domestic and global terrorism, as well as “enhance law
enforcement investigatory tools”); see also President’s Remarks, The White House,
President Signs Anti-Terrorism Bill (Oct. 26, 2001) (lauding the Patriot Act as an
“essential step in defeating terrorism” that will give law enforcement officials
“important new tools”), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/
20011026-5.html.
3. See President’s Remarks, supra note 2 (verifying that President Bush signed
the Act into law on October 26, 2001).
4. See Patriot Act § 1, 115 Stat. at 272-75 (displaying ten separate titles and a
total of 158 subsections). Each subsection makes numerous amendments to the
United States Code, and these amendments vary in length and specificity. Id. §§ 11016, 115 Stat. at 275-402. Some amendments replace existing terms, while others
add new paragraphs and subsections to existing definitions and enforcement
guidelines. Id.
5. See Surveillance Under the “USA/Patriot” Act, ACLU Online Archives (Jan.
1, 2002) (explaining that Congress passed the Patriot Act because the Bush
Administration “bullied” Congress into it, and remarking that the bill went “straight
to the [Congressional] floor with no discussion, debate, or hearings”), at
http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cfm?ID=13465&c=130 (on file with the
American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law).
6. See United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977) (defining pen
register as “a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a telephone by
monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is
released”).
7. See Patriot Act §§ 201-25, 115 Stat. at 278-95 (introducing, under a heading
titled “Enhanced Surveillance Procedures,” twenty-five sections describing the
government’s authority to intercept and seize various forms of electronic
communications); see also Jennifer C. Evans, Comment, Hijacking Civil Liberties:
The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 933, 965-66 (2002) (noting that
the amendments to the existing wiretap laws “expanded the ability of the Department
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commentators across the political spectrum, the amendments to this
area of the law jeopardize an already fragile privacy interest in the
content of electronic, computer-based communications.8
This Comment argues that the Patriot Act’s pen register
amendments threaten First Amendment academic freedom
guarantees in addition to Fourth Amendment privacy rights.9 This
Comment suggests that academic research in controversial areas, such
as terrorism or critical examination of national security policy, will
suffer a particular burden as a result of the government’s enhanced
Internet surveillance powers.10
Part I examines how the Patriot Act expanded the government’s
Internet surveillance power through seemingly innocuous
“modifications” to the pen register law.11 Part I also reviews the law
and technology on which today’s Internet monitoring is based.12
Because privacy rights and free speech rights are closely intertwined
in surveillance law, Part I briefly discusses concerns that the new pen

of Justice to place wiretaps” on computers and telephones of terrorism suspects, and
that these amendments form the basis for the “Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism” portion of the USA PATRIOT Act’s title).
8. See ROBERT A. LEVY, CATO INST., THE USA PATRIOT ACT: WE DESERVE BETTER
(n.d.) (expressing strong concern that the Patriot Act permits “rubber-stamp judicial
supervision of phone and Internet surveillance”), available at http://www.cato.org/
current/terrorism/pubs/levy-martial-law.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2005) (on file with
the American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law); see also Robin
Mejia, More Surveillance on the Way, THE NATION, Oct. 30, 2002 (criticizing privacy
invasions the Patriot Act made possible), at http://www.thenation.com/
doc.mhtml?i=20021111&s= mejia20021030.
9. See infra Part II.A (explaining that scholars have argued that the Act violates
the Fourth Amendment probable cause standard and using Justice Douglas’ First
Amendment “penumbra theory” to suggest that, in modern times, the freedom to
conduct Internet research for scholarship purposes is a facet of the First Amendment
guarantee of free inquiry).
10. See infra Part II.B-C (expanding upon the holdings and reasoning of prior
case law to argue that broad restrictions on speech and poorly delimited government
surveillance powers chill inquiry into and discussion of politically sensitive topics); see
also R. Kenton Bird & Elizabeth Barker Brandt, Academic Freedom and 9/11: How
the War on Terrorism Threatens Free Speech on Campus, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y. 431,
436-37 (2002) (observing that the post-September 11 threat to academic freedom is
the greatest since the days of the Vietnam War protests).
11. See infra Part I.B (providing an in-depth discussion of how the post-Patriot
Act pen register definition enabled the federal government to glean a considerable
amount of personal information from records of Web use data); see also Rich
Haglund, Comment, Applying Pen Register and Trap and Trace Devices to Internet
Communications: As Technology Changes, Is Congress or the Supreme Court BestSuited to Protect Fourth Amendment Expectations of Privacy?, 5 VAND. J. ENT. L. &
PRAC. 137, 145 (2003) (defending the amendments to the pen register/trap and trace
statutes as “modifications” that fall short of creating a “new law of the Internet” and
instead merely help police “keep up with changing” communications technologies).
12. See infra Part I.A (discussing in detail the Wiretap Act of 1968, the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, and the evolving definition of pen register/trap
and trace equipment).
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register law endangers Fourth Amendment guarantees.13
Part II begins by arguing that the First Amendment includes the
right to conduct Internet research.14 Part II then assesses the
constitutionality of the pen register law in light of the judiciary’s
reaction to analogous laws that have sought to grant government
authorities broad regulatory or surveillance powers.15
The
constitutional assessment presupposes that the pen register statute,
like any surveillance law, has two main functions that could implicate
the First Amendment: the elimination of specific criminal activity and
the more mysterious act of long-term data-gathering and recordkeeping.16 The final section of Part II suggests that the pen register
law places a real and substantial burden on scholars that courts should
not dismiss as merely theoretical.17
Part III of the Comment proposes ways to preserve the enhanced
surveillance provisions of the pen register amendments while
continuing to allow American citizens and others to browse the
Internet without fear of government intrusion into their scholarly
activities.18 This Comment concludes that the current pen register
law poses an unnecessary and unacceptable danger to the First
Amendment guarantee of intellectual freedom.19

13. See infra Part I.B (noting that journalists and civil liberties groups fear that
government monitoring of Web-surfing activity burdens privacy rights because Web
addresses can contain personal information); see also United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct.
for the E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (explaining that national security
cases are unique in that they involve a “convergence of First and Fourth Amendment
values” with historic roots in the English “struggle for freedom of speech and press”).
14. See infra Part II.A (arguing that Internet research, as a modern-day
component of freedom of inquiry, fits comfortably within the Supreme Court’s liberal
and long-standing formulation of First Amendment guarantees).
15. See infra Part II.B-C (exploring the Supreme Court’s generally negative
response to laws and regulations that chill intellectual endeavors by explicitly
forbidding certain forms of speech or authorizing surveillance of politically
controversial activities).
16. See infra Part II.C (noting that while the pen register law seeks to curtail
criminal activity, it also goes beyond this objective and allows data-gathering for
virtually any reason); see also E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. at 320 (conceptualizing
“official surveillance” as a potentially oppressive government activity that serves the
two objectives of “criminal investigation” or “ongoing intelligence gathering”).
17. See infra Part II.D (arguing that a scholar’s fear of Internet surveillance
substantially chills academic activity and Constitutes a justiciable injury for which to
seek a remedy in court).
18. See infra Part III (discussing strategies for redrafting portions of the pen
register law or limiting its scope and duration to harmonize it with the panoply of
First Amendment intellectual freedom guarantees).
19. See infra Conclusion (stating that the low evidentiary hurdle that law
enforcement must overcome to secure an Internet pen register order burdens the
First Amendment right to free inquiry and represents the triumph of national security
considerations over Constitutional rights).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The Development of Pen Register Surveillance Law Prior to the
Patriot Act
Courts historically have resisted concluding that law enforcement
violates a person’s Fourth Amendment rights when it secretly records
and analyzes the telephone numbers that a person dials.20 Judicial
reluctance to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in
telephone numbers also extends to the Internet, as several recent
federal circuit decisions have shown.21 As a result, Congress largely
has shouldered the burden of deciding which forms of electronic
communication, and under what circumstances, merit privacy
protection.22
The first major piece of federal telephone-line surveillance
legislation was Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, commonly referred to as the Wiretap Act.23 This
law proscribes the unauthorized collection and analysis of the
contents of telephone conversations.24 The Wiretap Act explicitly
permits, however, the use of pen register/trap and trace equipment.25
Generally defined, a pen register is a mechanical device or

20. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (holding that the
monitoring of dialed phone numbers does not implicate the Fourth Amendment
because people generally do not have a subjective privacy expectation “in the
numbers they dial”).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp.2d 504, 508-09 (W.D. Va.
1999) (concluding that the Fourth Amendment, when applied to the technology of
the Internet, does not protect an Internet customer’s privacy expectation in personal
information released to an Internet service provider); Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325,
335-36 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in non-content
Internet information, such as the user’s subscriber data because the user placed the
information under the control of a third party); see also Orin S. Kerr, Internet
Surveillance Law After the USA PATRIOT Act: The Big Brother That Isn’t, 97 NW. U.
L. REV. 607, 630 (2003) (describing telephone and Internet surveillance law as a
“constitutional vacuum” that federal statutory law, rather than judicially rendered
constitutional interpretation, has filled).
22. See Kerr, supra note 21, at 630 (noting that Congress passed a law banning
wiretapping before the Supreme Court held that wiretapping violates the Fourth
Amendment, and that Congress has since conducted an ongoing review of
surveillance statutes in light of evolving “social norms”).
23. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2515 (2003) (listing definitions of surveillance terms
and placing specific restrictions on the interception and disclosure of
communications); see also Kerr, supra note 21, at 630 (noting that the Wiretap Act
still regulates telephone monitoring today).
24. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2511(1),(4)(a) (stating that those who intercept wire, oral,
or electronic communications without a court order or proper certification will be
fined, imprisoned for up to five years, or both).
25. See id. § 2511(2)(g)(i) (stating that, despite the prohibition on intercepting
the substance of any communication, it “shall not be unlawful” for law enforcement
agents to use a pen register or trap and trace device).
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procedure that, when attached to a telephone line, monitors and
records the electrical impulses generated by the act of dialing a
telephone number.26 These impulses, analyzed together, reveal the
numbers dialed from a given telephone but nothing about the
Telephone companies have long
conversations themselves.27
employed pen register technology for billing and various other
purposes.28
The complement to the pen register is the trap and trace device,
which collects the numbers associated with incoming telephone
calls.29 Like the pen register, the trap and trace device neither
“hears” nor records the actual conversations of the party under
surveillance.30 In light of these definitions, it seems that the Wiretap
Act’s drafters never envisioned pen register/trap and trace equipment
as technology that could collect the actual substance of
communications.31
As stated earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court recognizes no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers a person dials.32
Instead, the Court has separated conceptually the number dialed
from the ensuing conversation and has granted Fourth Amendment
protection only to the latter.33 An analogous distinction exists
between the address on an envelope and the letter inside: the former
26. ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F. Supp.2d 20, 22 n.3 (D.D.C. 2003)
(quoting N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 161 n.1).
27. See id. (noting that pen registers record telephone numbers without
overhearing oral communications and without indicating whether the suspect has
completed the call).
28. See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 174-75 (stating that phone companies regularly
use pen registers to ensure correct dialing, check for overbilling, and to discover
whether a customer is running a business with her home telephone).
29. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3127(4) (2003) (defining the trap and trace device in
language virtually identical to that of the pen register definition, but stating that trap
and trace devices capture incoming electronic impulses generated by dialing a
telephone number). Pen registers capture outgoing information only. Id. § 3127(3).
30. See id. § 3127(4) (emphasizing that the “dialing, routing, addressing, and
signaling” information that a trap and trace device captures shall not include the
contents of any communication).
31. See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 167-68 (analyzing the Wiretap Act and
concluding that the Act’s drafters did not regard pen registers as a threat to privacy
because these instruments do not record the contents of communications).
32. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (reasoning that, because all
telephone users must transmit the numbers they dial to the telephone company, and
because telephone users know that the company can make permanent records of the
numbers dialed, people could not have an actual expectation of privacy in this
information).
33. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (recognizing a
constitutionally protected privacy interest in a conversation made from a telephone in
a public booth, and adding that one who uses a telephone booth is “surely entitled to
assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the
world”).
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is merely “addressing” information, while the latter is considered
“content” information and thus falls within the protection of the
Fourth Amendment.34 This distinction has allowed the pen register
to play a very broad role in federal surveillance activities, but its postPatriot Act application is of questionable constitutional legitimacy.35
The first statute explicitly governing federal pen register use
appeared within a series of amendments to the Wiretap Act and
eventually became part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
of 1986 (“ECPA”).36 Under the ECPA, a magistrate “shall enter an ex
parte order authorizing the installation and use of a pen register” if
the investigator “has certified to the court that the information likely
to be obtained . . . is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.”37
The relevance standard is far less rigorous than probable cause.38
Moreover, the Justice Department acknowledges that judicial approval
of pen register/trap and trace equipment is a procedure that is
“ministerial in nature.”39 Once federal law enforcement agents
obtain the order, they may use the surveillance device for up to sixty
days before requesting additional sixty-day extensions.40
From its enactment up until the passage of the Patriot Act, the
ECPA made it clear that law enforcement officials could use pen
register equipment only to collect numbers dialed and sent over a

34. See Surveillance Under the “USA/Patriot” Act, supra note 5 (discussing the
two types of surveillance distinguished in the original pen register law).
35. See Kosko, supra note 1, at M5 (warning that the Patriot Act gives the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) broader powers to monitor Internet activity than
before).
This is especially worrisome because no one knows whether the
government’s data-gathering technology will properly separate Web content from
Web addressing information. Id.
36. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3121-3127 (2003) (describing the procedures for the
issuance of a pen register order as well as the rules governing law enforcement’s
installation and use of a pen register).
37. Id. § 3123(a)(1).
38. See ROBERT M. BLOOM & MARK S. BRODIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 4.1 (2d ed.
2000) (defining probable cause as an evidentiary hurdle that requires “specific facts,
not simply conclusory assertions” that add up to more than a vague suspicion but less
than proof beyond a reasonable doubt); see also Surveillance Under the
“USA/Patriot” Act, supra note 5 (describing the evidentiary requirement for pen
register use as “essentially non-existent”).
39. See COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECTION, CRIMINAL
DIVISION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS (2002) [hereinafter SEARCHING AND
SEIZING COMPUTERS] (explaining that a court will grant a pen register order without
assessing the veracity of the stated facts if the applicant states her name, identifies the
agency investigating the crime, and certifies that the desired information is relevant
to the investigation), at http:// www.cybercrime.gov/s&smanual2002.htm (last visited
Apr. 21, 2005).
40. See id. (describing the application and issuance procedures for a pen register
order and stating that, during the time the pen register is in use, the investigating
officer should not disclose its existence to anyone).
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telephone line.41 Nevertheless, some courts assumed that the ECPA’s
definition of the pen register was flexible enough to allow monitoring
of computer network communications as well as telephonic
communications.42 Despite the courts’ broader application, however,
at least one federal magistrate judge adhered to the idea that pen
registers were available only for telephonic surveillance.43
B. How the Patriot Act Expanded the Surveillance Capacity of the Pen
Register Law
Widespread public anxiety after the September 11 tragedies
spurred Congress to grant some of the Justice Department’s demands
for enhanced surveillance capability.44 One result was the Patriot
Act’s revisions to the pen register law, which redefined the pen
register to cover Internet as well as telephone monitoring.45 Congress
similarly expanded the definition of the trap and trace device.46
While the Justice Department has pointed out that the pen register
amendments expressly forbid the collection of the “contents of any
communication,”47 journalists and commentators have discovered
ambiguity in the new law because no bright-line distinction exists
between addressing information and content on the Internet.48 The
Patriot Act’s language, they argue, is far too simplistic to address this

41. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3127(3) (1986) (amended 2001) (defining a pen register as
a device that records “numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on the telephone
line” and noting that this statutory definition does not include devices used by a
provider of a wire or electronic communication service).
42. See Kerr, supra note 21, at 634 (noting that a federal magistrate judge in Los
Angeles granted an Internet pen register order despite his recognition that the
drafters of the original pen register statute never imagined this use for the device).
43. See id. at 635 (noting that a magistrate judge in northern California denied a
government application for an Internet pen register order after reviewing the ECPA’s
pen register law and concluding that the law covered only telephonic devices).
44. See id. at 636 (explaining that the Justice Department had been “clamoring
for changes to the antiquated surveillance laws for years”).
45. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3127(3) (2003) (defining a pen register as a “device or
process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling
information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic
communication is transmitted”).
46. See id. § 3127(4) (defining a trap and trace device as something that
“captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the originating
number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information”).
47. See SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS, supra note 39 (stating that the newly
amended pen register law regulates the collection of “addressing and other noncontent information”); see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 3127(3) (permitting the use of a pen
register to capture information so long as that information does not include the
“contents of any communication”).
48. See Surveillance Under the “USA/Patriot” Act, supra note 5 (analogizing a list
of Internet addresses to a list of purchased books, and arguing that both contain rich
and revealing information).
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puzzling problem.49
The pen register law’s ambiguity stems from the idea that, unlike a
telephone number, an Internet address contains an element of
content.50 While a telephone number is strictly a sequence of digits,
an Internet address could contain search terms, concepts, titles, and
trademarks, as well as the names of businesses, schools, or political
organizations.51 In light of the variety and abundance of words
potentially present in an Internet address, the American Civil
Liberties Union (“ACLU”) has characterized Internet addresses as a
source of “intimate information that reveals who we are and what we
are thinking about.”52 The expanded definition of the pen register,
now addressing and signaling information in electronic
communications, strongly suggests that government agents now may
access lawful Internet addresses with nothing more than a pen register
order.53
II. OVERBREADTH IN THE PEN REGISTER AMENDMENTS AND THE
DANGER TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. The First Amendment Encompasses Freedom of Inquiry
Civil libertarians generally have invoked the Fourth Amendment for
their most withering attacks on the expanded pen register law.54
49. See, e.g., NANCY CHANG, CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, THE USA
PATRIOT ACT: WHAT’S SO PATRIOTIC ABOUT TRAMPLING ON THE BILL OF RIGHTS?
(2001) (arguing that the Patriot Act’s pen register definition offers the government
broad discretion in deciding what to monitor), available at http://www.ccrny.org/v2/reports/docs/USA_PATRIOT_ACT.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2005).
50. See Surveillance Under the “USA/Patriot” Act, supra note 5 (observing that
the term “Internet address” is a misnomer because a Web page is really the title of a
document that a person downloads from a remote computer to her own computer).
51. See id. (explaining that the address of a Web page generated by filling out an
online order form often contains the names of the products that the customer has
selected for purchase).
52. See id. (noting, by way of example, that an approved pen register application
could now make this result of a Google search available to law enforcement
authorities:
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF8&q=
sexual+ orientation). Because a person’s sexual orientation is a deeply personal
matter, the ACLU argues that most people would expect these and other search
results to remain private and protected. Id.
53. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3127(3) (including Internet communications within the
statutory definition of pen register). But see Kerr, supra note 21, at 638-39 (arguing
that, in the absence of the current pen register law and the court order requirement,
there would be no federal privacy law whatsoever to restrict the government’s ability
to monitor the Internet).
54. See, e.g., CHANG, supra note 49 (arguing that the Patriot Act launches a
“three-pronged assault” on privacy rights that includes giving the government
“unprecedented and largely unchecked surveillance power” and ability to monitor
the Internet, permitting law enforcement agencies to circumvent probable cause
when conducting wiretaps for national security purposes, and allowing the exchange
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Unfortunately, this intense focus on Fourth Amendment rights largely
has overshadowed discussion of the pen register law’s implications for
First Amendment rights.55 Intimately linked to the issue of privacy in
Internet use is the issue of free speech and, more specifically,
intellectual freedom.56
Courts have long recognized that the First Amendment protects far
more than the mere oral or written expression of ideas.57 Justice
Douglas, for instance, famously reasoned that each provision of the
Bill of Rights possesses a “penumbra” that encompasses numerous
unnamed but constitutionally protected activities.58 In a description
of the rights that give the First Amendment “life and substance,”
Justice Douglas employed his penumbra theory to argue that the
Amendment protects not only freedom of speech and press but also
“the right to read... and freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and
freedom to teach.”59
In modern times, the right to conduct Internet-based research for
academic purposes is an important part of “freedom of inquiry,” and,
as such, falls within the scope of the First Amendment.60 Intrusive law
enforcement is nothing new.61 Throughout American history,
of information between criminal and intelligence operations).
55. See id. (arguing that the Patriot Act endangers not just Fourth Amendment
rights but also First Amendment rights, such as freedom of political association and
freedom to voice dissent, by broadening the definition of domestic terrorism to
include activities that “appear to be intended . . . to influence the policy of a
government by intimidation or coercion”).
56. See Surveillance Under the “USA/Patriot” Act, supra note 5 (explaining that
the Patriot Act grants the federal government unfettered power to investigate
people’s Internet and library usage, book purchases, travel habits, and other activities
that the First Amendment protects).
57. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (holding that the
right to family planning receives protection within a “zone of privacy” emanating
from several constitutional amendments including First Amendment free speech
guarantees as well as Fourth Amendment privacy guarantees). The Court observed
that the Constitution guarantees many individual rights that do not appear
specifically in its text. Id.
58. See id. at 484 (stating that numerous Supreme Court decisions over the years
demonstrate that explicitly mentioned guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by “emanations from those guarantees”).
59. Id. at 482.
60. See, e.g., Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp.2d 1088, 1092 (W.D. Wash.
2001) (stating that a civil subpoena compelling the disclosure of names of anonymous
Internet users should satisfy a high threshold because First Amendment protections
encompass Internet-based speech activity); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870
(1997) (holding that regulation of the Internet demands nothing less than stringent
First Amendment scrutiny because it provides an ideal forum for a vigorous exchange
of thoughts and ideas).
61. See Robert A. Pikowski, An Overview of the Law of Electronic Surveillance
Post September 11, 2001, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 601, 603 (2002) (discussing the history of
surveillance law and noting that Congress passed the Communications Act of 1934
with the partial goal of making wiretap evidence inadmissible in federal courts).
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government surveillance has been an almost reflexive response to
perceived threats to national security.62 However, the reckless data
collection that the Patriot Act sanctions poses a uniquely modern
dilemma: by exposing Internet addresses to government surveillance,
the expanded pen register law may inhibit Internet-based scholarly
inquiry into terrorism or national security policy.63 Though the new
law does not ban explicitly research or any other First Amendment
activity, there is little or no constitutional difference between an
unstated burden and an outright ban on such activities.64
B. Judicial Rejection of Past Legislative Attempts to Regulate or
Prohibit Intellectual Speech
The U.S. Supreme Court has long viewed the right to exchange
ideas freely as inseparable from freedom of intellectual inquiry.65 For
this reason, the unfettered commerce of ideas ranks among the most
fiercely protected activities in the United States.66 The relationship
between freedom of inquiry and the freedom to share ideas received
special attention in Sweezy v. New Hampshire.67
At issue in Sweezy was an anti-”subversive behavior” statute that
penalized a professor for discussing socialism in the classroom.68 In
62. See Eric Lardiere, Comment, The Justiciability and Constitutionality of
Political Intelligence Gathering, 30 UCLA L. REV. 976, 976 n.3 (1983) (tracing the
origin of American political intelligence to 1860, when President Abraham Lincoln
called for investigations of Northerners suspected of sympathizing with Southern
secessionists).
63. See Brigitte Anderson & William Rossiter, Backward March! The USA-Patriot
Act and the Bill of Rights, 12 MONT. PROFESSOR 6, ¶ 27 (Spring 2002) (advising
readers to “be careful what you put in the Google Search,” and warning that, under
the expanded surveillance provisions of the Patriot Act, a graduate student
researching Al Qaeda, a political scientist studying Sinn Fein, or an activist for
Amnesty International all could be exposing their communications to the
government and could become the target of investigation), available at
http://mtprof.msun.edu/Spr2002/BAWRart.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2005).
64. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826 (2000)
(invalidating restrictive provisions of the Telecommunications Act on First
Amendment grounds, and reasoning that an overbroad regulation deserves no
“special consideration or latitude” simply because the regulation burdens, rather than
blatantly suppresses, a constitutional right).
65. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 262-63 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (emphasizing the importance of shunning any government regulation
that tends to “check the ardor and fearlessness of scholars,” and defining freedom of
inquiry as freedom to examine, question, and engage in “disputation on the basis of
observation”).
66. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (observing that the
United States has a profound commitment to safeguarding academic freedom,
“which is of transcendent value” to everyone).
67. See 354 U.S. at 250 (noting that freedom to express inflammatory political
ideas is no less fundamental to a democratic society than freedom to acquire
knowledge).
68. See id. at 246 (explaining that the statute in question comprehensively
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striking down the statute for its broad sweep, the Court described the
law as a “strait jacket” upon academic inquiry and warned that such a
restriction on speech could severely hamper the learning process.69
The Court supported its holding by reasoning that all areas of
scholarship, and especially controversial ones, provide endless
opportunities to gain wisdom and knowledge.70
While scholars of terrorism or Islam may arouse the suspicion of
government agents and become the targets of electronic surveillance,
these subjects are no less valid as academic fields than is the study of
Marxism.71 Moreover, like the academic activity at issue in Sweezy,
Islamic studies and terrorism merit special protection because of, not
despite, their controversial nature.72 For these reasons, burdening
inquiry into the latter subjects is as unconstitutional an act as
burdening inquiry into the former.73
The Supreme Court issued a similar ruling several years later in
Keyishian v. Board of Regents.74 The law at issue in Keyishian
punished “treasonable” or “seditious” behavior without defining those
two adjectives, and the Court reasoned that the law endangered free
speech by creating uncertainty about the speech or conduct being
regulated.75 As a means of vividly portraying the nightmarish
regulated subversive activities, with the goal of eliminating from state employment
any person who commits an act detrimental to the United States or its constitutional
form of government).
69. See id. at 250 (asserting that students, and the teachers who guide them, are
vital to the preservation of democracy, and cautioning that “[s]cholarship cannot
flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust”).
70. See id. (arguing that researchers have not explored any field so thoroughly
that new discoveries are impossible, and that this may be especially true in fields
“where few, if any, principles are accepted as absolutes”).
71. See Bird & Brandt, supra note 10, at 449 (observing that, for many years prior
to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, scholars had been exploring the origins
of Islamic fundamentalism and dissatisfaction with U.S. foreign policy).
72. See AMERICAN COUNCIL OF TRUSTEES AND ALUMNI, DEFENDING CIVILIZATION:
HOW OUR UNIVERSITIES ARE FAILING AMERICA AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 6-7
(2002) (asserting that choosing to study Islam instead of American history is
considered tantamount to stating that Americans were responsible for the deaths and
destruction of September 11, 2001), available at http://www.goacta.org/
publications/reports/defciv.pdf (on file with American University Journal of Gender,
Social Policy and the Law).
73. See Kathryn Martin, Note, The USA PATRIOT Act’s Application to Library
Patron Records, 29 J. LEGIS. 283, 290-91 (2003) (noting that the First Amendment
includes the right to receive speech and protects the efforts of a “curious mind” to
learn more about political or world views with which many may disagree).
74. See 385 U.S. at 597-98 (noting the oppressive nature of a New York statutory
provision that broadly called for the removal of any public-school employee
responsible for any “treasonable or seditious word or words or the doing of any
treasonable or seditious act or acts”).
75. See id. at 598 (comparing the statutory provision to the Sedition Act of 1798,
which similarly failed to specify the meaning of “seditious,” and cautioning that the
absence of a definition of the word “treasonable” in the statutory provision makes this

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol13/iss2/3

12

McClintick: Web Surfing In Chilly Waters: How The Patriot Act'S Amendments to

2005]

WEB-SURFING IN CHILLY WATERS

365

consequences of such a vague restriction, Justice Brennan invoked the
image of a frightened academic who can only “guess what conduct or
utterance may lose him his position.”76 Furthermore, in Keyishian, as
in Sweezy, the Court employed the metaphor of a “strait jacket” to
illustrate the danger of broad regulations on intellectual life.77
A strait jacket on scholarship similar to the ones discussed in Sweezy
and Keyishian exists today. The pen register law permits authorities
to record Internet addressing information whenever it becomes
relevant to a criminal investigation.78 This language allows broad
discretion in the gathering of Internet addresses from a search.79 In
Sweezy, the distinction between a subversive person and a loyal one
was unclear.80 In Keyishian, the teachers feared crossing the shadowy
line between seditious and non-seditious acts.81 Scholars today could
find that the line between what is relevant and irrelevant to a criminal
investigation likewise lies in shadow, causing education to suffer as a
result.82
Sweezy and Keyishian are two examples of lawmakers’ failed efforts
to ferret out socially disruptive speech and conduct at the expense of
intellectual freedom.83 Other statutes have burdened academic
inquiry by regulating access to inflammatory or obscene books. The
word “no less dangerously uncertain”).
76. See id. at 604 (arguing that only extremely precise laws that clearly alert
teachers of the forbidden behavior can combat the chilling effect on First
Amendment rights because these rights cannot survive without “breathing space”).
77. See id. at 603 (warning of imperiling America’s freedom by “impos[ing] any
strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities”) (quoting
Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250).
78. See Patriot Act § 216, 115 Stat. at 290 (amending the pen register law to allow
law enforcement authorities to collect the addressing information of any electronic
communication that may seem relevant to criminal activity).
79. See SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS, supra note 39 (stating somewhat
paradoxically that the distinction between addressing information and content
applies to the Internet, despite the fact that there can sometimes be “debate” about
what constitutes content in electronic communications).
80. See 354 U.S. at 246 (noting that the definition of subversive persons in the
statute casts a net over far more people than just those who seek violent overthrow of
the government).
81. See 385 U.S. at 599 (emphasizing that the definition of seditious is virtually
limitless, and theorizing that the law could punish a teacher who carries a copy of the
Communist Manifesto in public).
82. See Anderson & Rossiter, supra note 63 (predicting that the vague language
in the Patriot Act may create “minefields of study,” such as aerosol biology or Middle
Eastern studies, that students will avoid pursuing for fear of intrusive surveillance or
criminal prosecution).
83. See Bird & Brandt, supra note 10, at 446 (describing the statutes at issue in
Sweezy and Keyishian as “sweeping and often clumsy attempts” to curtail subversive
behavior, and suggesting that these two cases stand for the bedrock principle that
“the state may not use universities as a weapon in an overbroad and ill-defined fishing
expedition”).
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Supreme Court examined and rejected such a statute in Bantam
Books v. Sullivan.84 Like the Patriot Act’s pen register amendments,
the law at issue in Bantam Books made it relatively easy for the
authorities to cast a watchful eye on activities intimately related to
academic inquiry, regardless of whether those activities were illegal.85
In striking down the statute, the Court reasoned that it would have
unduly burdened adults by making it much harder for them to
acquire books deemed too obscene for young people.86 Remaining
faithful to the spirit of this decision nearly forty years later, the Court
held that a vaguely worded statute forbidding sexually explicit
depictions of minors would prevent adults from reading textbooks
and classic works of literature.87
The Supreme Court is likely to be as critical of legal interference
with Internet research as it was of book regulation, given the similar
educational roles of the two media.88 The Court addressed the
relationship between education and Internet regulation when it
evaluated the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”).89 Like
the pen register law, the CDA suggested that a broad range of Webbased activity could trigger an investigation or criminal liability.90 In
striking down the CDA for failing to define “indecent” and “patently
offensive” communications, the Court once again refused to allow
sweeping regulations to burden the learning process.91 Since this
84. See 372 U.S. 58, 60 (1963) (striking down a Rhode Island statute that
established a local commission to investigate and prosecute those who sold books
containing “obscene, indecent, or impure” language). Another part of the statute
called upon the commission to promote morality by investigating situations that
could cause “undesirable behavior in juveniles." Id.
85. See id. at 72 (holding that the operation of the commission was nothing more
than a “scheme of state censorship,” and noting that the law creating the commission
sought not to advise booksellers but to “suppress” their lawful activities).
86. See id. at 71 (arguing that the commission’s mandate was vague, resulting in
book distributors’ elimination of a wide variety of adult books and forcing adults to
cross state lines in order to find these prohibited publications).
87. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 252-54 (2002)
(invalidating on First Amendment grounds the Child Pornography Prevention Act of
1996, which prohibited any virtual or actual visual depiction of minors engaging in
sexual conduct). The law’s broad language would, for example, prevent adults from
looking at photos in psychology textbooks or watching film adaptations of
Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet. Id. at 246-48.
88. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 853 (analogizing an Internet search to the act of
selecting books from a “vast library including millions of readily available and indexed
publications”).
89. See id. at 849 (examining two provisions of the Communications Decency Act
of 1996 that sought to shield minors from “indecent” or “offensive” Internet-based
communications).
90. See id. at 859 (noting that the statute subjected violators of the Act’s
provisions to a fine and/or a prison sentence of up to two years in length).
91. See id. at 878 (criticizing the open-ended provisions of the law for their
potential to ban artistic renderings of nude images, as well as Web-based inquiries
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decision, other courts confronting challenges to similar legislation
have embraced the theory that broad regulation of Internet use chills
inquiry into various critical issues.92
The aforementioned decisions show that legislatures generally have
failed in their attempts to regulate educationally valuable speech,
books, or electronic communications by enacting statutes containing
sweeping proscriptive language.93 The Patriot Act’s pen register law
limits the exercise of First Amendment rights to an equal, if not
greater degree, by targeting the vast category of Web-browsing
information that law enforcement officials may deem relevant to a
criminal investigation.94 In so doing, the law ignores the enormous
contribution that modern communications technologies play in the
exploration of ideas.95 On a more general level, this impediment to
free speech violates the constitutional requirement that a law clearly
and accurately draws the line between unfettered and regulated
speech at all times.96
C. Beyond Specific Proscriptions: How Indiscriminate Data-Gathering
Chills Intellectual Activity
The pen register law, like the statutes under attack in Sweezy,
Keyishian, and the later cases discussed in the previous section,
provides only a vague description of the activity under regulation.97
The difference between those statutes and the pen register law,
however, is that the former generally provided a swift and clear
punishment for a violation of the proscribed behavior, while the latter
allows law enforcement to generate and compile records of Internet
into such subjects as prison rape, safe sex, and birth control).
92. See, e.g., ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1152-53, 1160 (10th Cir. 1999)
(invalidating a New Mexico law proscribing computer communications depicting
“sexual conduct,” and noting that the plaintiffs’ Internet-based “speech” included
informative discussions of art, literature, sexuality, and civil rights issues).
93. See, e.g., Playboy, 529 U.S. at 827 (striking down on First Amendment
grounds a provision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 requiring cable
television providers to “scramble” erotic programming or limit it to late hours).
94. See Evans, supra note 7, at 977 (arguing that the extremely low evidentiary
requirement of relevance allows law enforcement to visit Web sites, review e-mail
communications, and severely undermine the privacy rights of many people whose
activities have nothing to do with the government’s criminal investigation).
95. See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 818 (characterizing technology as a “revolution” that
“expands the capacity to choose” among competing opinions and statements about
esthetics, morality, and other academic subjects).
96. See id. at 817 (cautioning that a failure to draw the fine line properly between
guaranteed and prohibited speech “exacts an extraordinary cost” of preventing
people from seeking knowledge without the intrusion of law enforcement).
97. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3123(a)(2) (explaining that the court will grant the pen
register order after a showing that the “information likely to be obtained . . . is
relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation”).
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addresses for no clear purpose.98 This potential for abusive and
indiscriminate data-gathering reinforces the argument that the
expanded pen register law, alone and in conjunction with other
provisions of the Patriot Act, chills scholarly activity.99
Legislators must narrowly tailor any law that authorizes data
collection on teachers in pursuit of a legitimate state purpose.100 In
Shelton v. Tucker, the Court determined that a statute requiring
teachers to disclose group membership lists inhibits their “free play of
the spirit” and, therefore, fails the narrow tailoring analysis.101
Because the pen register law makes it relatively easy for authorities to
collect lists of Web addresses that a teacher or student visits, it
burdens their “free play of the spirit” in a similar way.102 A slightly
earlier decision had emphasized that such a close nexus between the
governmental purpose for proscribing the speech or activity and the
restraint upon the freedom to express becomes critical when
unpopular views are vulnerable to suppression.103 The pen register
law does not satisfy a narrow tailoring analysis because it is unclear
that gathering and analyzing Internet address information will achieve
its intended governmental interest—namely, preventing acts of
terrorism.104
Even when the legislative purpose is more urgent and compelling

98. Compare Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 614 (displaying the full anti-sedition statute,
which provided for the “disqualification or removal” of teachers who violate its
provisions), with SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS, supra note 39 (noting that the
Pen/Trap Statute broadly defines pen register devices, which applies to a wide range
of communications technologies that capture and store addressing information).
99. Cf. Michael N. Dolich, Note, Alleging a First Amendment “Chilling Effect” to
Create a Plaintiff’s Standing: A Practical Approach, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 175, 175-76
(1994) (illustrating the chilling effect of government surveillance by describing a
hypothetical person who avoids a public meeting because the FBI will monitor it).
100. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (explaining that the
principle of narrow tailoring requires lawmakers to employ the least drastic and
restrictive means of achieving the legitimate governmental interest).
101. See id. at 487 (explaining that the Bill of Rights protects teachers’ freedom to
think and act upon their thoughts). The Arkansas statute at issue in Shelton required
every state teacher to submit a list of all organizations to which he or she belonged
during the previous five years. Id. at 488.
102. See SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS, supra note 39 (describing the
procedure for obtaining a pen register order, and explaining that the judicial role in
approving pen register devices is only “ministerial” (quoting United States v. Fregoso,
60 F.3d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1995))).
103. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 464-66 (1958) (invalidating a policy
requiring the NAACP to reveal its membership lists to the state, and reasoning that
the state’s goal of identifying illegal business practices was an insufficient justification
for burdening the NAACP’s activities).
104. See Kerr, supra note 21, at 636 (stating that the attacks of September 11 “did
not directly implicate the Internet”); see also Martin, supra note 73, at 298 (arguing
that monitoring a person’s reading activity to determine if she is a terrorist is no more
effective than monitoring a person’s dietary habits to determine if she is Moslem).
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than a teacher’s competency or the discovery of illegal business
activities, the Supreme Court insists that government data collection
activities still satisfy a narrow tailoring analysis.105 The Court
remained loyal to this principle, for instance, in Gibson v. Florida
Legislative Investigation Committee, where the Court found the
express purpose of the legislation was the identification of communist
threats to national security.106 The Court emphasized that a broad
list-making power deprives free speech guarantees of the “breathing
space” essential to their survival.107
The federal government’s fearful efforts to combat communist
infiltration during the McCarthy era parallel the government’s
Indeed, some
reaction to the modern terrorist threat.108
commentators assert that the current war on terrorism will wreak even
more long-term havoc on civil liberties than did McCarthyism.109
Whether the perceived threat is communism or terrorism, national
security is a vital governmental interest that the Court has, at times,
used to justify extraordinarily repressive measures.110 Nevertheless,
the Court’s decisions in both Gibson and in subsequent cases firmly
establish that broad data collection for national security purposes
must yield to the right to learn, question, and research controversial
topics.111 This principle should apply equally to the present-day
105. See Shelton, 364 U.S. at 488 (stating that even a legitimate and substantial
government purpose can never justify means “that broadly stifle fundamental
personal liberties” if there is the possibility of an equally effective and more closely
tailored statute).
106. See 372 U.S. 539, 549 (1963) (rejecting the argument that it is permissible to
require admittedly legitimate organizations to disclose their membership records
when the purpose of such a requirement is the general prevention of communist
infiltration).
107. See id. at 544 (arguing that data collection and other subtle forms of
governmental interference are just as suspect as more overt attempts at regulation
when these methods restrict the exercise of First Amendment guarantees).
108. See Lardiere, supra note 62, at 976-77 (predicting, nearly two decades before
the September 11 terrorist attacks, that if the government perceives a threat to its
stability as it did with communism until 1976, the government will again resort to
unconstitutional data-gathering against innocent citizens).
109. See, e.g., Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Nadine Strossen and Freedom of
Expression: A Dialogue with the ACLU’s Top Card-Carrying Member, 13 GEO. MASON
U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 185, 206-07 (2003) (reproducing a statement of ACLU president
Nadine Strossen, who argues that much of the civil rights abuse of the McCarthy era
ended with the dismantling of congressional committees, whereas the civil liberties
violations the Patriot Act sanctions will remain indefinitely because statutes are very
difficult to repeal once they are “on the books”).
110. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944) (holding that
the internment of Japanese-Americans after the attack on Pearl Harbor was an
acceptable means of satisfying the overwhelmingly important goal of national
security).
111. See Gibson, 372 U.S. at 567 (Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing that farreaching surveillance and record-keeping powers allow the government to “look over
the shoulder of everyone who reads” and ultimately discourage free inquiry); see also
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scholar whose attempts to explore controversial topics may appear to
some as evidence of criminality or terrorism.112
Freedom of inquiry suffers when government data-gathering
burdens the scholar’s search for information, and this is no less true
outside of a classroom or organizational setting.113 Lamont v.
Postmaster General,114 decided just two years after Gibson, protected
the First Amendment rights of an individual who sent for and
received communist propaganda via the postal service.115 The Court
explained its reasoning by noting that postal mail functions as a
vehicle for the “flow of ideas.”116
Because searching the Internet is in many ways the modern
equivalent of sending away for published, hard-copy information, the
Lamont Court’s “flow of ideas” metaphor accurately characterizes
computer-based communications.117 The pen register laws, like the
postal service statute, create an opportunity for the government to
gather data whenever it determines that the activity of the
information-seeker is controversial.118 As mentioned earlier, the
Constitution combats this phenomenon by guaranteeing a large
degree of anonymity to those who exercise their right to explore
controversial subjects.119
E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. at 314-21 (striking down a federal statute authorizing the
President and Attorney General to gather and maintain intelligence pertaining to
subversive forces, and reasoning that such official surveillance chills criticism of
government policies).
112. See Sean Mussenden et al., USF Professor Arrested on Terror-Related
Charges, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 21, 2003, at A1 (discussing the arrest of Professor
Sami Al-Arian, whom the FBI accused of using the “academic environment” at the
University of South Florida as a “staging point” for terrorist activity on behalf of the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad).
113. See Bird & Brandt, supra note 10, at 437 (noting that the notion of academic
freedom, as defined by the American Association of University Professors and
recognized by law, includes the right to talk and write about matters outside of the
classroom and beyond one’s field of expertise).
114. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
115. See id. at 305-07 (invalidating on First Amendment grounds a federal postal
service statute that allowed the Postmaster General to detain all mail appearing to
contain communist political propaganda until the addressee submitted a reply card
requesting delivery of the mail).
116. See id. at 306 (noting that the postal service statute hinders the flow of mail,
and thus the “flow of ideas,” by requiring administrative officials to inspect the mail
for communist propaganda, set it aside if it contains such propaganda, write the
addressee about the problem, and await the reply card before finally sending the mail
to the addressee).
117. See Surveillance Under the “USA/Patriot” Act, supra note 5 (noting that
visiting a Web page is really the act of downloading the information from an
electronic document on a remote computer to the Web-surfer’s computer).
118. See Lamont, 381 U.S. at 307 (expressing concern that schoolteachers and
other public officials will fear disastrous consequences if the government believes that
they are sending for and receiving treasonous materials).
119. See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462-63 (invoking First Amendment protection after a
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Legal scholars and commentators often invoke George Orwell’s
“Big Brother” concept when attempting to show how ever-present,
real-time government surveillance creates anxiety and diminishes free
will.120 Generally, this effect still arises even if the person under
surveillance knows that her activities are lawful.121 Courts have
recognized, for instance in White v. Davis, that free speech and
inquiry suffer dramatically when undercover officers sit in college
classrooms and compile records of their observations.122 The
preservation of the classroom as the “crucible of new thought” has
guided these decisions.123
Given the enormous amount of
information it offers, one could view the Internet as another crucible
of thought.124 In light of this analogy, the use of a pen register to
collect Web-surfing activity is no less Orwellian than the use of
undercover policemen to monitor classroom discussions.125
A fear of Orwellian surveillance procedures, however, is not
necessarily enough to invalidate a national security or crime-control
measure.126 In Anderson v. Sills,127 for example, the New Jersey
Supreme Court upheld police department policies authorizing official

showing that sharing membership lists and records with others has exposed individual
members to loss of employment, threats of physical harm, and general public hostility
in the past and could bring about these same results again).
120. See James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78
WASH. L. REV. 1, 12 (2003) (observing that data-collection systems, like the radically
authoritarian regime known as “Big Brother” in George Orwell’s novel, 1984, are an
ongoing form of observation that limit freedom by tightening the government’s hold
over various aspects of citizens’ lives).
121. See id. at 15 (noting that most people legitimately fear that information
collected about them could be used in a derogatory or dangerous manner, even
where the information is mundane and harmless).
122. See 533 P.2d 222, 229 (Cal. 1975) (invalidating on free-speech grounds a
policy of the Los Angeles Police Department that allowed undercover policemen to
attend university classes and meetings in order to take notes for their files). The goal
of this practice was the anticipation and prevention of future crime. Id. at 227.
123. See id. at 231 (describing the campus classroom as sacred and warning that
classroom surveillance practices by undercover police endanger everyone’s sense of
security in free expression and is only one step removed from a totalitarian regime).
124. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 851-52 (noting that Internet newsgroups accommodate
about 100,000 daily message postings, allowing for the exchange of information on
everything from music to politics, and concluding that the Internet is as varied and
colorful as the full range of human thoughts).
125. See Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth
Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1103-04 (2002) (arguing that the
absence of checks on the government’s power to collect Web-surfing information
poses a threat to anonymity in intellectual pursuits, and that such an absence is one
facet of an anti-democratic culture).
126. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (upholding the Secretary of
State’s revocation of an American citizen’s passport because it is “obvious and
unarguable” that no government interest is more important than national security).
127. 265 A.2d 678 (N.J. 1970).
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data-gathering at public events.128 Though Sills may seem at odds
with White, the specific rights of education and freedom of inquiry
were more directly at stake in the latter case.129 Because these rights
have an exalted position among the First Amendment guarantees,
burdens on those rights may invite even greater scrutiny than burdens
on the right to assemble.130
The decisions above also suggest that courts evaluate data-gathering
methods more rigorously if a legislative body has sanctioned those
methods.131 The Supreme Court provided support for this idea two
years after Sills when it upheld army surveillance tactics not unlike
those at issue in Sills.132 In each case, the data-gathering occurred
pursuant to a general policy or practice rather than an actual law.133
The Internet surveillance provisions in the pen register law, by
contrast, are a product of Congress and therefore should not escape
full judicial review.134
D. Internet Surveillance Anxiety as a Justiciable Injury
Given the Laird Court’s refusal to address the merits of, let alone
strike down, the Army’s broad surveillance tactics, a student or
teacher may have difficulty persuading a court that the Patriot Act
chilled her Internet use enough to warrant a remedy.135 However,
128. See id. at 688-89 (upholding the constitutionality of an internal police
department memorandum that urged law enforcement officials to exercise their
crime-prevention duties by gathering intelligence on rallies, demonstrations, and
other public events because such actions were necessary and reasonable for police to
accomplish their mission).
129. Cf. id. at 682-83 (emphasizing that the plaintiffs only “envision” harassment
and injury as a result of police surveillance at protests, demonstrations, marches, or
other purely hypothetical activities).
130. See Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (discussing the inherent value of academic
freedom and stating that it is a “special concern of the First Amendment”).
131. See, e.g., Sills, 265 A.2d at 684 (noting that the surveillance provisions
appeared in a general memorandum circulated among law enforcement agencies,
and concluding that the Constitution demands precision only of a legislative
enactment).
132. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1972) (holding that Army surveillance
policies do not cause an unconstitutional chilling effect on citizens’ exercise of their
First Amendment rights).
133. See, e.g., id. at 16 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that the Army’s activities
under challenge result from Pentagon policy rather than law). If Congress had
passed an actual law authorizing surveillance this extensive, “a most serious
constitutional problem” would exist. Id.
134. See LEVY, supra note 8 (noting that the Patriot Act subverts the separation of
powers doctrine by authorizing “rubber-stamp judicial supervision” of government
surveillance of the Internet, and warning that the Executive branch will not always use
its power in benevolent or constitutional ways).
135. See Laird, 408 U.S. at 11 (explaining that the complainant lacked standing to
allege a chilling effect because the Army’s policy was not “regulatory, proscriptive, or
compulsory in nature” and did not injure the complainant through any regulations or
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while the pen register laws are neither directly regulatory nor
proscriptive, the harm that they could inflict on an Internet
researcher is real.136 Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has not
distinguished between a burden on a First Amendment right and the
wholesale elimination of that right.137 Indeed, a legally actionable
injury can result from a system of ongoing surveillance that creates
nothing more than the mere possibility of a First Amendment
burden.138
The arguments above support the proposition that, Laird
notwithstanding, the question of what constitutes a justiciable First
Amendment injury remains unsettled.139 For example, due to the
ease with which the government can obtain a pen register order and
monitor Web sites, a person may avoid researching terrorism via the
Internet.140 This type of “chill” stems from a fear of punishment for
exploring or expressing an unpopular idea, and several courts have
recognized that such a fear is a valid injury.141
The fear may be particularly acute, and the injury exceptionally
proscriptions).
136. See Nehf, supra note 120, at 13 (comparing the victim of data collection to
the protagonist in Franz Kafka’s The Trial, who feels terrified, powerless, and
vulnerable upon being arrested and learning that the police have been monitoring
his activity).
137. See Lamont, 381 U.S. at 308-09 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that
regulations that indirectly control speech require a compelling state interest because
the inhibition of First Amendment rights is as unconstitutional as the prohibition of
those rights); see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-39 (1963) (invalidating
restrictions on the business activities of NAACP lawyers and noting that even
unintended encroachment on free speech guarantees are unconstitutional).
138. See Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 161 (D.D.C. 1976)
(holding that the Army’s electronic surveillance and reporting procedures may call
for a damages remedy because even attempted restraints on First Amendment
freedoms by government actors cause an injury that demands redress); see also
Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 407 F. Supp. 115, 119-20 (N.D. Ill. 1975)
(holding that the police department’s constant surveillance activities may have chilled
plaintiffs’ exercise of their First Amendment rights, thereby presenting a justiciable
controversy).
139. See Dolich, supra note 99, at 179-80 (noting that legal scholars have roundly
criticized the Laird decision for leaving “many important questions unanswered” and
creating much ambiguity as to whether a chilling effect creates a legally redressable
harm).
140. See Charles Levendosky, Patriot Act Chills First Amendment Freedoms, ABSCBN News.com (Jan. 22, 2003) (arguing that the Patriot Act chills one’s freedom to
read, and speculating that the Act’s surveillance laws may cause someone who reads a
book about revolution to be a suspect in a terrorism investigation), at
http://fact.trib.com/1st.lev.noinfoDOJ.html (on file with the American University
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law).
141. See, e.g., Levin v. Harleston, 966 F.2d 85, 90-91 (2d Cir. 1992) (concluding
that a university professor’s fear of discipline for expression of a controversial race
theory amounted to a cognizable injury entitling him to relief); United Food &
Commercial Workers Int’l Union v. IBP, Inc., 857 F.2d 422, 429-30 (8th Cir. 1988)
(holding that a restrictive statute injured union workers by causing them to fear arrest
or prosecution for the constitutionally protected activity of picketing).
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severe, if one considers the pen register definition’s relationship to
other parts of the Patriot Act. Even an innocent person reasonably
may worry that investigators will, at some future date, interpret the
fruits of their surveillance as evidence of terrorism or other forms of
criminal activity.142
One basis for this fear is the Patriot Act’s expansive definition of
terrorism, which could cause the government to regard numerous
Web sites with suspicion.143 Once law enforcement authorities certify
that an Internet researcher’s work is somehow relevant to an
investigation, little prevents them from determining that Web sites
discussing Al Qaeda, for example, seek to influence national policy by
intimidation or coercion.144 Less than three months after September
11, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft went a step further by
suggesting that people who criticize the “War on Terror” only would
be helping the enemies of the United States.145
Another basis for this fear of arrest is the “technology-neutral”
definition of the pen register itself, which may enable investigators to
use inappropriately sophisticated and intrusive data-collection devices
as they monitor the Internet.146 At the same time, another section of
the Patriot Act grants immigration officials and various other
authorities easy access to terrorist-related surveillance data.147 Thus,
142. See Nehf, supra note 120, at 23-24 (noting that data collection allows
businesses or law enforcement to judge people on the basis of scattered information,
and that this often leads to a harmful and negative mischaracterization of a person).
143. See Patriot Act § 802, 115 Stat. at 376 (defining domestic terrorism as acts
dangerous to human life, which are a violation of the criminal laws of the United
States, and are intended “to intimidate or coerce a civilian population” or “influence
the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion”).
144. See CHANG, supra note 49 (arguing that law enforcement could construe the
Patriot Act’s definition of domestic terrorism broadly to justify surveillance of
environmental activists, anti-abortion activists, and political organizations that
question government policies).
145. See Testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary (Dec. 6, 2001) (advising all those who “scare peace-loving people
with phantoms of lost liberty” that such statements “only aid terrorists” and “erode
our national unity and diminish our resolve”), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
ag/testimony/2001/1206transcriptsenatejudiciarycommittee.htm.
146. See SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS, supra note 39 (noting that the pen
register/trap and trace devices have such “broad, technology-neutral” definitions that
law enforcement agents may not always know whether a given device fits the statutory
definition of these instruments); see also CHANG, supra note 49 (stating that the
vague language of the pen register provisions implicitly permit the use of Carnivore
(now called DCS-1000), a controversial surveillance tool that may collect Web pages
visited and other content). But see Haglund, supra note 11, at 141 (arguing that
criticism of DCS-1000 is inaccurate, because this device collects only source and
destination information, as opposed to specific terms in the Web address, when
operating in pen register mode).
147. See Patriot Act § 203, 115 Stat. at 281 (stating that investigators may share any
foreign intelligence information they obtain from a criminal investigation with any
“Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or
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under this system of potentially reckless surveillance and liberalized
data-sharing, it seems that officials will possess almost limitless power
to scrutinize a person’s Web addresses.148 As with the new definition
of terrorism, these concerns have a basis in reality: the Patriot Act
already has enabled the government to arrest scholars whose activities
may or may not indicate a true terrorist threat.149
The infamous “nationwide service” provision of the Patriot Act
provides the third major way that law enforcement may abuse the pen
register to the detriment of Internet users.150 Because it allows
investigators to use a single pen register order to monitor Internet
usage anywhere in the United States, commentators fear that it
unconstitutionally authorizes the equivalent of blank warrants.151
This procedural simplification arguably strips away some of the
judiciary’s power and legitimacy.152
This system of virtually
unchecked surveillance may scare Internet researchers into confining
their scholarship to “safe” topics.153 Such an environment further
discourages explorations of Islam or terrorism at a time when these
constitutionally protected activities are already coming under fire.154
national security official” in order to assist that official in her own duties); see also
Surveillance Powers: A Chart, ACLU Online Archives (2002) (explaining that, prior
to the passage of the Patriot Act, much of the information gleaned from surveillance
procedures was unavailable to non-relevant law enforcement authorities), at
http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cfm?ID=13601&c=130 (last visited Apr. 9,
2005).
148. See Evans, supra note 7, at 983 (arguing that the extensive sharing of
surveillance data among government agencies effectively erases their separate roles
and makes them more likely to abuse their power).
149. See, e.g., Mussenden et al., supra note 112, at A1 (stating that Attorney
General Ashcroft credits the Patriot Act, and particularly its data-sharing provision
between intelligence and law enforcement, for the investigation and arrest of
Professor Sami Al-Arian).
150. See Patriot Act § 216, 115 Stat. at 288-89 (amending Title 18 of the United
States Code to authorize a court to issue a pen register/trap and trace order
“anywhere within the United States,” as opposed to the specific jurisdiction in which
the investigator wishes to conduct surveillance).
151. See Evans, supra note 7, at 978-79 (arguing that, because the Fourth
Amendment requires the court to state with particularity the person or place to be
searched, the “nationwide service” of pen register orders violates this constitutional
requirement).
152. See id. at 978 (noting that, under the blank warrant system, the judge will be
unable to ensure that investigators are focusing on the correct target and collecting
data for legitimate reasons).
153. See Nehf, supra note 120, at 11 (stating that limitless surveillance and datacollection evoke images of Bentham’s Panopticon, which allowed full surveillance of
hundreds of prisoners simultaneously by a single authority). Knowledge of
surveillance, whether from the Panopticon or modern methods of data collection,
curtails free will and shapes human behavior to satisfy a prescribed norm. Id.
154. See AMERICAN COUNCIL OF TRUSTEES AND ALUMNI, supra note 72, at 6
(criticizing American colleges and universities for adding courses on Islamic and
Asian cultures, instead of additional courses on “the civilization under attack,” after
the September 11 events).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2005

23

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 3

376

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 13:2

III. “FIXING” THE PEN REGISTER STATUTE: FEARS AND SOLUTIONS
Given the vagueness of the Patriot Act’s definition of the pen
register and the problematic ways in which this definition interacts
with other Patriot Act provisions, a legally justiciable chill on an
Internet user’s freedom of inquiry certainly exists.155 This section
proposes ways to correct the constitutional defects in the pen register
legislation while preserving law enforcement’s ability to combat crime
and safeguard national security.156
The drafters of the Patriot Act’s expanded pen register definition
probably presumed that the phrase “routing, addressing, and
signaling information” would exclude content from Internet
surveillance.157 The Justice Department believes that this is the case,
and it notes that the pen register law explicitly forbids the collection
of “content.”158 Nevertheless, because the definition of Internet
content is no clearer than the concept of Internet addressing
information, the argument is circular and does nothing to clarify the
law’s ambiguity.159
An obvious way to save this provision from its own vagueness is to
define one or both of these terms in technology-specific language.160
Much of the confusion would disappear, for instance, if the pen

155. See Dolich, supra note 99, at 189-90 (noting that, though the law of standing
and judicially cognizable injury is still taking shape, a regulation containing a veiled
threat to the exercise of free speech rights may pose a legally actionable injury).
156. See generally LEVY, supra note 8 (stating that the U.S. government’s most
important obligation is the protection of life from “domestic and foreign predators”
while safeguarding civil liberties to as great a degree as possible).
157. See Anti-Terrorism Investigations and the Fourth Amendment After
September 11: Where and When Can the Government Go to Prevent Terrorist
Attacks? Oversight Hearing Before the House Constitution Subcommittee (May 20,
2003) (opening statement of Steve Chabot, Chairman, House Constitution
Subcommittee) (noting that the Patriot Act limits the government’s pen register
surveillance powers to pure “addressing” information while explicitly barring the
collection of content), at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/printers/108th/
87238.PDF (on file with the American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy &
the Law).
158. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3127(3) (stating that the addressing information that the
pen register collects “shall not include the contents of any communication”); see also
SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS, supra note 39 (stating that Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, and not the pen register
statute, allows the seizure of Internet contents).
159. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(8) (defining content, as the term appears in the pen
register statute, as “any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning”
of “any wire, oral, or electronic communication”); see also Kerr, supra note 21, at 647
(noting that the Patriot Act’s pen register provisions represent a “missed opportunity”
to clarify the foggy distinction between addressing and content information in
human-to-computer communications).
160. See Kerr, supra note 21, at 647 (noting that the statutory definition of
“contents” is unacceptably vague and has not changed since 1986, many years before
the arrival of the Internet).
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register definition stated that addressing information, in the Internet
context, includes only “source and destination information.”161 This
relatively simple solution presumably would satisfy scholars who fear
that surveillance of their Internet research will reveal too much about
their thoughts or interests.162
In the absence of changes to the statutory definitions, Internet
researchers might feel less fearful of intrusive surveillance if it were
more difficult to obtain a pen register order.163
Currently,
investigators need only state the crime under investigation.164 It is
very likely that more speech and privacy protection would be available
if pen register applicants had to show probable cause and obtain a
warrant.165 Moreover, even those who question the assumption that a
probable cause showing would increase privacy seem to accept that
this evidentiary requirement would not hamper law enforcement.166
Conditioning the granting of a pen register order upon a showing
of probable cause is a more drastic proposal than it may appear
because it necessitates overruling the Supreme Court decision in
Smith, which deals with the pen register.167 Judges, however, never
have embraced fully the notion that transactional information, such as
telephone numbers and Web addresses, deserve such minimal privacy
protection.168 In addition, commentators note that the Smith
161. See Haglund, supra note 11, at 141 (explaining that any surveillance device
that limits its collection to Internet source and destination information could retrieve
no letters, words, or search terms from a Web address beyond the Internet protocol,
such as yahoo.com).
162. See Surveillance Under the “USA/Patriot” Act, supra note 5 (arguing that a
list of Web addresses that a person visits displays intimate information about a
person’s thoughts and identity, much like the title of a book that a person wishes to
read).
163. See Evans, supra note 7, at 977-78 (arguing that the current “relevant to an
ongoing criminal investigation” standard of proof is extremely low and has the
unpleasant effect of disrupting the lives of many innocent people with which the
government has no interest).
164. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3123(b)(1)(D) (requiring that the contents of the order
shall specify “a statement of the offense to which the information likely to be
obtained by the pen register or trap and trace device relates”).
165. See Solove, supra note 125, at 1162-63 (arguing that the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement, issued upon a finding of probable cause, helps prevent the
government from abusing its surveillance powers by minimizing its collection powers
to only essential information thereby ensuring that a specific person is the target of
the surveillance, and by calling for a neutral and detached magistrate to authorize the
surveillance).
166. See Kerr, supra note 21, at 639 (conceding that a “specific and articulable
facts” requirement would not significantly hamper law enforcement, even if this
evidentiary requirement protects privacy only “on paper”).
167. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 744 (reasoning that a person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in the telephone number she dials because using a telephone
requires conveying that number to the telephone company and thus “assum[ing] the
risk” of disclosure).
168. See id. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that a telephone number
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holding is antiquated and increasingly unpopular.169 Finally, Smith
seems to go against most people’s intuitive conception of privacy.170
For these reasons, and because modern telephonic communications
resemble Internet communications, overruling Smith statutorily may
be appropriate and even desirable.171
Because the Patriot Act’s definition of domestic terrorism is as
sweeping as the definitions of content or addressing, it too requires
revision to protect the Internet researcher from undeserved
surveillance.172 A meaningful and appropriately precise definition of
domestic terrorism should not draw within its scope potentially
ambiguous activities, such as those intended to “intimidate or coerce a
civilian population”173 or “influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion.”174 Thus, Congress should repeal the two
subparts above and leave the third provision, which describes the
malicious nature of true terrorism more accurately.175
Another solution involves placing clear time limits on the duration
of every clause of the pen register law and the intra-governmental
data-sharing provisions of the Patriot Act.176 These Congressionally

contains an element of content because, like a full conversation, it could reveal “the
most intimate details of a person’s life” by displaying the identities of the caller and
the people called).
169. See Solove, supra note 125, at 1137-38 (observing that Smith has received a
great deal of criticism over the years because its holding is based on simplistic notions
of privacy that allow electronic monitoring to become increasingly intrusive as
surveillance technology evolves).
170. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (expressing doubt as to
whether “there are any who would be happy to have broadcast to the world” a record
of the telephone numbers they have dialed); see also Haglund, supra note 11, at 137
(observing that despite the Supreme Court’s position, people generally regard
addressing information, such as Internet addresses, as private).
171. See Haglund, supra note 11, at 147 (explaining that the technology in use to
route telephone calls increasingly resembles the packet-based technology in use to
transmit computer communications).
Because this new form of telephone
technology, like computer communications, blurs the distinction between addressing
and content information, a pen register order may soon be as inappropriate for
telephone calls as it is for the Internet. Id.
172. See CHANG, supra note 49 (cautioning that until Congress clarifies the
definition of terrorism, the public needs a mechanism that closely monitors the types
of organizations and activists that the government selects for surveillance pursuant to
this definition).
173. Patriot Act § 802, 115 Stat. at 376.
174. Id.
175. See id. (providing an amendment to the United States Code that defines
terrorism as activities intended to “affect the conduct of a government by mass
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping”).
176. See Ann Harrison, Behind the USA Patriot Act (Nov. 5, 2001) (noting that
while certain portions of the Patriot Act expire in 2005, the pen register law and the
provision allowing the sharing of grand jury information will continue indefinitely),
at http://www.alternet.org/story.html?StoryID=11854?.
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determined expiration dates, known as “sunset laws,” 177 may be the
path of least resistance. Sunset laws preserve the Patriot Act’s
statutory language and all underlying judicial decisions while ensuring
that any resulting incursions on civil liberties last no longer than
national security concerns require.178
On the negative side, however, sunset provisions raise troublesome
questions concerning the acceptable duration of burdens on basic
constitutional rights.179 More specifically, the comprehensive sunset
solution fails to address the extent to which investigators may monitor
Web browsing.180 A comprehensive set of sunset provisions, however,
would at least provide Congress with an opportunity to reevaluate the
Patriot Act and draft a more efficient and narrowly tailored law from
scratch.181
A final proposal involves leaving the pen register law and other
parts of the Patriot Act untouched while raising public awareness of
the real-life threat these provisions pose to First Amendment rights.182
The government could help by reversing course and sharing pre- and
post-Patriot Act data-collection statistics with the public.183 University
leaders also could raise awareness of civil liberty issues by
encouraging, rather than stifling, inquiry into government policies.184
177. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1450 (7th ed. 1999) (defining a sunset law as a
“statute under which a governmental agency or program automatically terminates at
the end of a fixed period unless it is formally renewed”).
178. See LEVY, supra note 8 (praising sunset laws as a means of ensuring that
drastic legislative measures are temporary and as a means of forcing the government
to justify periodically any continuing intrusions on civil liberties).
179. See Jacob R. Lilly, Note, National Security at What Price?: A Look Into Civil
Liberty Concerns in the Information Age Under the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and
a Proposed Constitutional Test for Future Legislation, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
447, 463 (2003) (observing that sunset provisions are powerless to prevent violations
while the questionable law is in effect and therefore provide little consolation to the
person whose constitutional rights suffer during this period).
180. See Kerr, supra note 21, at 639 (explaining that the pen register amendments
actually enhanced privacy protections on the Internet by requiring a court order for
surveillance, where quite possibly no authorization was necessary before).
181. See Richards & Calvert, supra note 109, at 208 (quoting ACLU President
Nadine Strossen, who argues that the Patriot Act, as a whole, is not narrowly tailored
to fight terrorism because “the vast majority of its provisions, even on their face, really
had nothing to do with terrorism” or deal only with criminal law enforcement in
general). Many members of Congress might not vote for the Patriot Act today if they
received a chance to reconsider their decision. Id. at 207.
182. See id. at 215 (pointing out that people are generally indifferent to the
constitutional rights of others until they believe that their own rights may be at stake).
183. See ACLU, 265 F. Supp.2d at 34-35 (denying the ACLU’s Freedom of
Information Act request that the Justice Department produce statistics revealing how
often and under what circumstances the government has used the Patriot Act).
184. See Bird & Brandt, supra note 10, at 459 (reporting that college presidents
often have disavowed controversial statements by faculty members and suggesting that
these administrators fear experiencing public criticism for endorsing unpopular
views).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2005

27

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 3

380

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 13:2

Widespread public apathy of both the average citizen and the Internet
scholar damages First Amendment safeguards more than terrorism or
the legislation Congress enacts to combat it.185
CONCLUSION
The Patriot Act’s amendments to the pen register statute, and
particularly the expanded pen register definition, burden intellectual
freedom by simplifying law enforcement’s ability to monitor and
record Web addresses. The history of pen register use and Congress’
rushed passage of the amendments suggest that this tool should not
extend to the Internet without a higher evidentiary showing.186
Because the precise connection between Web browsing and terrorism
remains unclear, allowing virtually unregulated collection of Internet
addresses “burn[s] the house to roast the pig.”187 National security
concerns seem to overshadow civil liberties under such a scheme, and
this runs counter to the spirit and tradition of American law.188
Textual modifications to the Patriot Act or a comprehensive sunset
plan may lighten the burden on freedom of Web-based inquiry.189 In
the meantime, the academic world can and should nurture the
exploration and debate of controversial ideas.190 Tolerance of new
perspectives and the desire for legislation embodying that tolerance,
however, are of paramount importance and must come solely from
the individual.191

185. See Richards & Calvert, supra note 109, at 241 (opining that the greatest
menace to free speech is too little awareness of and interest in other people’s rights to
express their ideas).
186. See Evans, supra note 7, at 988 (noting that because the Patriot Act provides
no specific guidelines governing how investigators should avoid capturing content
with an Internet pen register order, greater collaboration between the Attorney
General and the FBI is necessary in this area).
187. See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (striking down a statute
banning the sale of lewd books to all members of the general public, and cautioning
that the State’s legitimate desire to “promote the general welfare” does not justify
legislation that “burn[s] the house to roast the pig”).
188. See Richards & Calvert, supra note 109, at 207-08 (noting Nadine Strossen’s
observation that, because no provision in the Bill of Rights explicitly states that
constitutional rights are subject to restriction during a time of war, the Constitution
contains a “presumption in favor of freedom”).
189. See Lilly, supra note 179, at 469 (proposing, as a means of making the Patriot
Act more constitutionally sound, a sunset clause lasting until the national security
crisis ends or until the end of a two-year period, whichever date comes first).
190. See Bird & Brandt, supra note 10, at 432 (noting that universities are uniquely
able to incubate the most advanced scientific, artistic, and political ideas because of
their “insularity” from popular opinion and economic concerns).
191. See Richards & Calvert, supra note 109, at 202 (calling upon everyone to
“look through the substance” of opinions they despise and recognize that free speech
principles cannot apply to themselves unless they apply equally to others).
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